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Scholars have championed “second look” statutes as a decarceral tool.
Second look statutes allow certain incarcerated people to seek resentencing
after having served a portion of their sentences. This Essay weighs the
advantages and disadvantages of these statutes as applied to children
sentenced to die in prison and argues that focusing on this small, discrete
group may be a digestible entry point for more conservative states who fear
widespread resentencing. Moreover, because early data indicates that
children convicted of homicide and released as adults have very low
recidivism rates, second look beneficiaries are likely to pose little threat to
public safety. While resentencing and even releasing these individuals would
not directly result in mass decarceration, it would serve as a litmus test for
expanding second look statutes to adults convicted of violent crimes—the
very group for whom meaningful decarceral efforts must ultimately be aimed.
The Essay also argues that second look legislation has the potential to
redress two specific sentencing problems common to cases involving
children: the inability to accurately assess an individual’s capacity for
change and racially discriminatory sentencing outcomes. To redress these
problems, and to avoid reflexive impositions of original sentences, this Essay
recommends three critical additions to juvenile second look statutes:
automatic eligibility for resentencing at age twenty-five, jury resentencing,
and inadmissibility of the defendant’s original sentence.
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Introduction
Six years ago, the District of Columbia enacted the Incarceration
Reduction Amendment Act of 2016, which permits anyone who committed
a crime before turning eighteen years old to petition for resentencing after
serving twenty years of their sentence.1 Based in part on the success exhibited
by released individuals—none of whom had reoffended—proponents pushed
for an extension of the Act.2 They argued that eligibility should be increased
to age twenty-five because neuroscience establishes that brain development
continues until that point.3 Thus, nineteen to twenty-four-year-olds exhibit
the same immaturity, vulnerability, and capacity for change that the Supreme
Court recently found makes children under eighteen less culpable than
adults.4
Resistance to the proposed extension was initially fierce. Mayor Muriel
Bowser expressed reservations because the extension did not adequately
factor in the wishes of crime victims.5 The Metropolitan Police Department
outright opposed the extension amendment, emphasizing an increase in gun
crime during the COVID-19 pandemic and warning that expanding eligibility
would lead to the “early release of hundreds of violent gun offenders.” 6 But
neither effort compared to the public lobbying campaign waged by the U.S.
Attorney’s Office of the District of Columbia, which prosecutes D.C.’s local
felony cases.7 In opposing the bill, the U.S. Attorney’s Office spread
misinformation both about D.C. and about the bill’s contents, notoriously
misrepresenting that D.C. had one of the lowest incarceration rates in the
1. Madison Howard, Second Chances: A Look at D.C.’s Second Look Act, AM. UNIV.
WASH. COLL. L.: THE CRIM. L. PRAC. (May 8, 2021), https://www.crimlawpractitioner.org/
post/second-chances-a-look-at-d-c-s-second-look-act.
2. Id.; Michael Serota, Taking a Second Look at (In)Justice, UNIV. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE
(Jan. 23, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/01/23/taking-a-second-look-atinjustice-by-michael-serota/ [hereinafter Serota, Taking a Second Look at (In)Justice].
3. Howard, supra note 1.
4. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573–74 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68
(2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012).
5. Howard, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Michael Serota, Commentary, Second Looks & Criminal Legislation, 17 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 495, 500–03 (2020).
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nation, when, in fact, the opposite was true.8 Even after retracting the
statement, the U.S. Attorney’s Office continued to falsely contend that the
statute’s extension would prevent resentencing judges from considering the
facts of the crime in their analysis.9 Despite this opposition, in 2021, the D.C.
Council passed the Second Look Amendment Act, extending the
resentencing opportunity to anyone whose crime occurred before age twentyfive and who had served a minimum of fifteen years, making the D.C. Act
one of the most expansive second look statutes in the country.10
Second look legislation provides a mechanism for reconsidering lengthy
sentences.11 Broadly defined, second look legislation includes laws that
confer new parole eligibility, require parole boards to consider new factors
for release, create special pathways for clemency, and permit courts to
resentence defendants to shorter periods of incarceration.12 This Symposium
Essay focuses on the last type of second look legislation, where, as with
D.C.’s Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act, defendants receive the
opportunity to petition a court for a resentencing hearing. Most commonly, a
defendant may petition the court for resentencing after serving a minimum
period of incarceration—anywhere from ten to thirty years—and meeting

8. Id. at 502.
9. Id. at 503 n.38.
10. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-403.03 (West 2021).
11. Though they are technically not resentencing procedures, many scholars include
geriatric and compassionate release in the second look category. Renagh O’Leary,
Compassionate Release and Decarceration in the States, 107 IOWA L. REV. 621, 636–40
(2022). These mechanisms typically permit an incarcerated person to obtain early release due
to a significant medical condition. See id. In these cases, either the parole board or the
Department of Corrections typically determines the release decision without court
intervention. See id.
12. See Second Chances Agenda, FAMM, https://famm.org/secondchances (last visited
Aug. 2, 2022) (chronicling pending second look legislation in the states). Second look statutes
anticipate sentence reductions. Courts disagree on whether increasing a sentence following a
resentencing hearing violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Compare United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 138–39 (1980) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
prevent the government from appealing a sentence on the grounds that it is too lenient), with
United States v. Jones, 722 F.2d 632, 637 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Double Jeopardy
Clause forbids increasing a sentence when it frustrates the defendant’s “‘legitimate
expectations’ as to the length of his sentence” (quoting DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 137)). Some
states bar imposing a higher sentence under the Double Jeopardy Clause in their state
constitutions. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; People v. Henderson, 386 P.2d 677, 684–86
(Cal. 1963); WASH. REV. CODE § 36.27.130(2) (2022).
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other threshold requirements.13 In other instances, prosecutors must initiate
the review.14
While there is growing interest in this type of second look legislation, there
is also pushback. Proponents of the legislation emphasize utilitarian
concerns.15 They contend that second look statutes are a corrective measure
for lengthy sentences that disregard and disincentivize rehabilitation and
result in costly prison overcrowding.16 Opponents stress that second look
statutes undermine retributive goals17 and upend finality.18 Legal scholars
have acknowledged that second look statutes have the potential to be
meaningful decarceral tools19 but lament that, in practice, relief is not widely
available—particularly to individuals convicted of violent crimes, who make
up the majority of people serving lengthy sentences.20 In light of these
groups’ concerns, this Symposium Essay identifies the individuals for whom
second look legislation is most likely to have a promise of success: children
sentenced to die in prison.21
13. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final
Draft 2017) (permitting defendants to petition for resentencing after serving fifteen years of
incarceration); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A(h) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final
Draft 2017) (permitting petition for resentencing after ten years for child defendants); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-403.03 (West 2021) (permitting defendants who committed crimes before
age twenty-five to petition for resentencing after fifteen years of incarceration).
14. See, e.g., Assemb. B. 2942, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
15. Shon Hopwood, Second Looks & Second Chances, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 93–99
(2019); Serota, Taking a Second Look at (In)Justice, supra note 2.
16. Hopwood, supra note 15, at 93–94, 96; Serota, Taking a Second Look at (In)Justice,
supra note 2.
17. Serota, Taking a Second Look at (In)Justice, supra note 2.
18. Hopwood, supra note 15, at 97.
19. See, e.g., O’Leary, supra note 11, at 634; Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Another Look at
Second-Look Sentencing, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 155 (2015) [hereinafter Ryan, Taking
Another Look]; Margaret Colgate Love & Cecelia Klingele, First Thoughts About “Second
Look” and Other Sentence Reduction Provisions of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing
Revision, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 859, 873–74 (2011) (indicating that there is a “consensus” that
courts have power to reexamine lengthy sentences in certain circumstances).
20. See, e.g., O’Leary, supra note 11, at 640, 657–59 (arguing that compassionate release
has failed as a decarceral tool because decision makers are reluctant to grant it for people
convicted of violent crimes).
21. I use the phrase “children sentenced to die in prison” to include those convicted of
crimes committed under the age of eighteen who have received sentences that are likely to
exceed their lifespans. These sentences include both life without parole and virtual life
sentences—which consists both of sentences of life with parole, where parole eligibility
exceeds fifty years, and of term-of-years sentences that exceed one’s natural life span. See
ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENT’G PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE AND
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This Essay argues that focusing on this small, discrete group may be a
digestible entry point for more conservative states that fear widespread
application of second look statutes. Limiting second look statutes to a group
with whom it is easier to sympathize than adults might also reduce political
pushback. Moreover, because early data indicates that children convicted of
homicide and released as adults have very low recidivism rates,22 released
individuals are likely to pose little threat to public safety. While resentencing
and even releasing these individuals would not directly result in mass
decarceration, it would serve as a pilot program for expanding second look
statutes to adults convicted of violent crimes—the very group for whom
meaningful decarceral efforts must ultimately be aimed.
The Essay also argues that second look legislation has the potential to
redress two specific sentencing problems common to cases involving
children: the inability to accurately and prospectively assess an individual’s
capacity for change, along with arbitrary and racially discriminatory
sentencing outcomes. To redress these problems, and to avoid reflexive
impositions of original sentences, this Essay recommends three critical
additions to second look statutes: automatic eligibility for resentencing at age
twenty-five, jury resentencing, and inadmissibility of the defendant’s original
sentence.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I chronicle the rise of second
look statutes and explore the positions of their proponents and detractors. In
Part II, I argue that a natural starting point for these laws is children sentenced
to die in prison, considering this group’s limited size, the likelihood of
success, and the constitutional mandate for sentencers to consider capacity
for change. In Part III, I evaluate second look statutes as a solution to two
problems posed by contemporary sentencing of these juvenile defendants.
First, I examine whether they create an opportunity for more accurate
sentencing outcomes by shifting “capacity for change” from a forwardlooking inquiry to a backward-looking one. Second, I assess whether second
look statutes may be utilized to render sentencing less arbitrary and racially
discriminatory. In Part IV, I recommend three procedural protections that
would render second look legislation more likely to achieve these aims and
explore additional benefits that could result from their implementation.

LONG-TERM SENTENCES 1, 16 (2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads
/2017/05/Still-Life.pdf.
22. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENT’G PROJECT, A SECOND LOOK AT INJUSTICE 10
(2021) [hereinafter GHANDNOOSH, A SECOND LOOK AT INJUSTICE], https://www.sentenc
ingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/A-Second-Look-at-Injustice.pdf.
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I. The Rise of Second Looks
In the last decade, second look statutes have presented an opportunity for
reconsidering lengthy sentences. Although the United States remains the
leading incarcerator in the world,23 new interest in curbing mass incarceration
has grown in the last decade.24 Since 2009, the prison population has fallen,
albeit modestly.25 Reformers have focused on the front-end of incarceration,
advocating for decriminalization of drug and other nonviolent crimes and for
shrinking the police footprint to reduce the number of people entering the
criminal legal system.26 Initially, less attention was paid to back-end
decarceral efforts, which would provide for the early release of individuals
already serving lengthy sentences.27 However, as it became clear that frontend reforms failed to put a meaningful dent in the prison population,
advocates and decarceral scholars began to champion back-end proposals,
including the liberalization of parole, compassionate or geriatric release, and
second look sentencing.28
One of the earliest—and also one of the most far-reaching—second look
provisions appeared in the Model Penal Code’s 2007 proposed revisions.29
In response to the rise of “extraordinarily long sentences,”30 the proposal
23. Criminal Justice Facts, SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/
criminal-justice-facts/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).
24. See, e.g., Teresa Mathew, How Over-Incarceration Is Driving a Push for Criminal
Justice Reform, PAC. STANDARD (May 8, 2018), https://psmag.com/social-justice/americaschanging-sentiment-toward-prisons (discussing a shift in American public sentiment away
from incarceration policy).
25. GHANDNOOSH, A SECOND LOOK AT INJUSTICE, supra note 22, at 7; NAZGOL
GHANDNOOSH, THE SENT’G PROJECT, CAN WE WAIT 60 YEARS TO CUT THE PRISON
POPULATION IN HALF? 1 (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2021/01/60-Years-to-Cut-the-Prison-Population-in-Half.pdf (indicating the U.S. prison
population has declined 11% since 2009).
26. See, e.g., ACLU, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION
RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING COMMUNITIES 10–12 (2011).
27. See O’Leary, supra note 11, at 633.
28. See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 26 (proposing back-end reforms such as parole eligibility
for elderly prisoners).
29. See Richard F. Frase, Second Look Provisions in the Proposed Model Penal Code
Revisions, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 196–97 (2009); Monday Morning Session - May 17,
2010, 87 A.L.I. PROC. 3, 33 (2010) [hereinafter Monday Morning Session] (“The second-look
provision, which would go back to a judicial decisionmaker of some kind in the current draft,
is something that is new, that is not based on close examples in existing legislation anywhere
in the United States.”).
30. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmt. a (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No.
2 2011).
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recommended permitting any defendant to petition for resentencing based on
“changed circumstances” following fifteen years of incarceration.31 At the
time, no state had anything like the Model Penal Code’s second look
provision.32 Six years later, the provision made it into the revised Model
Penal Code—alongside an additional provision allowing for the resentencing
of child defendants after ten years of incarceration.33
Debate over the Model Penal Code proposal framed future second look
conversations. The Code’s commentary emphasized the need to reexamine
lengthy sentencing decisions, as norms and laws change over time, and
sought to ensure these decisions remained “intelligible and justifiable at a
point in time far distant from their original imposition.”34 The drafters
stressed the normative position that the government should approach
sentencing with humility and exercise caution before imposing sentences that
detain people for most of their adult lives.35 While they admitted possible
shortcomings, including administrative costs,36 the risk of placing potentially
unpopular decisions in the hands of elected judges,37 and the limited impact
on incarceration rates,38 they concluded that the potential benefit outweighed
the costs.39
Critics attacked the drafters’ utilitarian aims, emphasizing the burden that
routine resentencing hearings could place on trial courts.40 They also
contended that the provision undermined finality, causing four potential
harms.41 First, they argued that finality is what gives punishment its deterrent
effect, suggesting that, without finality, punishment can be seen as less final
31. Frase, supra note 29, at 196; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 (AM. L. INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2 2011).
32. See Frase, supra note 29, at 197 (noting that the provision was almost deleted in
drafting “because it has almost no existing state or federal counterpart”).
33. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 305.6, 6.11A(h) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final
Draft 2017); Debra Cassens Weiss, Momentum Builds for ‘Second Look’ Legislation That
Allows Inmates to Get Their Sentences Cut, ABA J. (May 19, 2021, 2:41 PM CDT),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/momentum-builds-for-second-look-legislationthat-allows-inmates-to-get-their-sentences-cut.
34. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmts. a–b (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft
No. 2, 2011).
35. Id. § 305.6 cmt. a.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 305.6 cmts. a, d.
38. Id. § 305.6 cmt. a.
39. Id. § 305.6 cmts. a, d.
40. Monday Morning Session, supra note 29, at 37–38, 39 (remarks of Judge Jon S. Tigar
and William J. Leahy).
41. Ryan, Taking Another Look, supra note 19, at 156–57.
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or less severe.42 Second, they maintained that finality promotes rehabilitation
by requiring defendants to accept their situation and begin to move forward,
instead of distracting themselves with litigating aspects of their case.43 Third,
they emphasized that finality limits expenditure of court resources.44 Finally,
these critics stressed that finality provides closure to victims.45
Critics also complained that the new provision did nothing to further
retributivist aims.46 They argued that the original sentencing judge was in a
better position to assess the harm the crime had caused the community and
that there was no reason to conclude that future sentencing was more
“accurate” simply because it was less harsh.47 One scholar observed that
“concluding that today’s moral values are somehow more true or correct than
yesteryear’s moral values seems problematic.”48
Although the Model Penal Code’s resentencing provision was initially an
outlier, support for second look legislation grew throughout the next decade.
The D.C. Council passed its original Incarceration Reduction Amendment
Act in 2016, predating the final revision of the Model Penal Code.49 In 2018,
the U.S. Congress passed the First Step Act with bipartisan support.50 In
addition to liberalizing the compassionate release process,51 the Act provided
a narrowly targeted second look, allowing individuals convicted of certain
crack cocaine offenses to petition for resentencing.52 That same year,
California permitted prosecutors to seek resentencing themselves, prompting

42. Id. at 156.
43. Id. at 156–57.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 152.
47. Id. at 151–52.
48. Id. at 162.
49. The proposed final draft of Model Penal Code: Sentencing was approved in May of
2017. Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Proposed Final Draft (Approved May 2017), UNIV. OF
MINN.: ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., https://robinainstitute.umn.edu/publications/
model-penal-code-sentencing-proposed-final-draft-approved-may-2017 (last visited Aug. 2,
2022).
50. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194; Nicole Ezeh, Bipartisan
Criminal Justice Bill Would Bolster Sentencing Reforms (Nov. 3, 2021), NCSL,
https://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publications-and-resources/bipartisan-criminal-justice-billwould-bolster-federal-sentencing-reforms-magazine2021.aspx.
51. Id. § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)).
52. The Act permitted courts to retroactively apply the provisions of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010 to reduce these sentences. Id. § 404, 132 Stat. at 5222.
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Los Angeles District Attorney George Gascón to create a sentencing-review
unit for those incarcerated at least fifteen years.53
In 2019, Senator Cory Booker and Representative Karen Bass introduced
federal second look legislation, which included a resentencing threshold of
ten years of served incarceration and a rebuttable presumption of release for
those over age fifty.54 In 2021, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers proposed its own model legislation, mirroring key terms of the
Booker/Bass bill.55 As of that same year, legislators in over twenty-five states
had introduced second look bills, and over sixty prosecutors and law
enforcement officers had publicly supported resentencing mechanisms.56
Proponents of second look legislation argue that these laws have the
potential to reduce the prison population (typically by freeing older prisoners
who no longer pose a public safety risk57), to align sentences with
contemporary mores,58 and to even redress historical racially discriminatory
sentencing.59 Professor Shon Hopwood has argued that shorter sentences
guard against recidivism, as lengthy incarceration has a criminogenic
effect.60 Other proponents believe that the opportunity for a second look
would incentivize rehabilitation.61 Professor Sarah French Russell has argued
that second look sentencing hearings would permit those serving long
sentences to offer narratives of rehabilitation that would humanize them and
provide evidence of their capacity to change.62
53. Assemb. B. 2942, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); GHANDNOOSH, A SECOND LOOK
supra note 22, at 4.
54. Second Look Act of 2019, S. 2146, 116th Cong. (2019); Press Release, Sen. Cory
Booker, Booker, Bass to Introduce Groundbreaking Bill to Give “Second Look” to Those
Behind Bars (July 15, 2019), https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-bass-tointroduce-groundbreaking-bill-to-give-and-ldquosecond-look-and-rdquo-to-those-behindbars.
55. JaneAnne Murray et al., Second Look = Second Chance: Turning the Tide Through
NACDL’s Model Second Look Legislation, 33 FED. SENT’G REP. 341, 341 (2021).
56. GHANDNOOSH, A SECOND LOOK AT INJUSTICE, supra note 22, at 6.
57. Hopwood, supra note 15, at 88–89; see GHANDNOOSH, A SECOND LOOK AT INJUSTICE,
supra note 22, at 29.
58. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.6 cmts. a–b (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft.
No. 2 2011).
59. Hopwood, supra note 15, at 94–95.
60. Id. at 93–94.
61. See, e.g., Sarah French Russell, A “Second Look” at Lifetime Incarceration:
Narratives of Rehabilitation and Juvenile Offenders, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 489, 514 (2013)
(describing how evidence of one’s rehabilitation in prison could provide persuasive support at
a future hearing for one’s release); Hopwood, supra note 15, at 97.
62. Russell, supra note 61, at 519.
AT INJUSTICE,
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Opponents echo their predecessors’ concerns about finality and
retribution, but they have also expressed concerns about jeopardizing public
safety,63 devaluing victims’ voices,64 and eroding the deterrent effect of harsh
punishment.65
While scholars generally agree that second look legislation has the
potential to be a meaningful decarceral tool, it remains unclear whether it will
function as such in practice. Richard Frase has questioned whether the Model
Penal Code’s second look provision will achieve decarceration: “Even if
hearings are granted with some frequency (and especially if they are not),
will inmates rarely see much (or any) reduction in their sentences?”66 Even
D.C.’s far-reaching Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act of 2016 had
only led to the release of eighteen people by the end of 2020.67
Professor Renagh O’Leary has argued that the second look mechanism of
compassionate release, which theoretically enables those with significant
medical vulnerabilities to petition for early release, has failed to achieve
meaningful decarceration, with states typically releasing only four to seven
people per year.68 O’Leary attributes this, in part, to exemptions in these
statutes for those convicted of certain violent crimes.69 O’Leary also notes,
however, that compassionate release decision makers often fall prey to an
“anti-release default,” resulting from their commitment to retributivism and
“extreme risk-aversion.”70
O’Leary explains that decision makers emphasize the nature of the crime
and the perceived risk to public safety at the expense of other factors.71
Because compassionate release statutes often fail to define risk, “[a]ny level
of risk that the person will commit any crime after release will be seen as
intolerable.”72 Paradoxically, this instinct is especially true for those
63. See supra note 6.
64. See supra note 5.
65. Ryan, Taking Another Look, supra note 19, at 156 (“The severity, certainty, and
swiftness of punishment have been said to be central components of deterrence, so
undermining the severity and certainty of punishment—or even maybe the certainty of the
extent of punishment—could undermine the deterrence value of punishment.”).
66. Frase, supra note 29, at 200.
67. Howard, supra note 1.
68. O’Leary, supra note 11, at 624.
69. Id. at 651–52. O’Leary notes that while no state exempts all violent crimes from
consideration, most include exemptions for some violent crimes, typically based on sentence
length, offense severity, or offense type. Id. at 652.
70. Id. at 646.
71. Id. at 646–48.
72. Id. at 658.
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convicted of violent crimes, even though the risk of violent-crime recidivism
is low.73
For second look sentencing generally, immediate release is not always at
issue. Instead, the question becomes, to what extent are decision makers
predisposed to reimpose the original sentence? Scholars in an array of
disciplines have written of an “anchoring effect,” where a decision maker
asked to determine a numerical value tends to ground their decision on the
first or most significant numerical value that they encounter.74 Both judges
and jurors are susceptible to anchoring.75 International research has shown
that anchoring is at play in courtroom decision-making, including in
determination of civil damages,76 bail amounts,77 and criminal sentence
lengths.78 Judicial sentencing decisions have been influenced by anchor
values appearing in pretrial motions,79 a prosecutor’s request,80 sentencing

73. See id.
74. Piotr Bystranowski et al., Anchoring Effect in Legal Decision-Making: A MetaAnalysis, 45 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 2 (2021).
75. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816 (2001).
76. See, e.g., Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s
Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445
(1999); Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You
Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCH. 519, 522 (1996);
John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different
Damage Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. SOC. PSYCH. 491 (1989); Dale W. Broeder,
The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 756–57 (1959).
77. See Mandeep K. Dhami, Psychological Models of Professional Decision Making, 14
PSYCH. SCI. 175 (2003).
78. See, e.g., Birte Englich, Blind or Biased? Justitia’s Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects
in the Courtroom Based on Given Numerical Representations, 28 LAW & POL’Y 497, 497
(2006) (studying German judges).
79. Guthrie et al., supra note 75, at 792–93.
80. See, e.g., Englich, supra note 78, at 500; Birte Englich et al., The Last Word in
Court—A Hidden Disadvantage for the Defense, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 707 (2005)
(discussing studies of German judges); Francisca Fariña et al., Anchoring in Judicial DecisionMaking, 7 PSYCH. SPAIN 56, 57 (2003) (studying Spanish judges); Birte Englich & Thomas
Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1535, 1547 (2001) (studying German judges).
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guidelines,81 a probation officer’s recommendation,82 and even a literal roll
of dice.83 At least one study has shown that a trial court’s initial sentence
serves as an anchor for reviewing courts.84 With second look legislation, the
concern is that the defendant’s initial sentence could serve as an anchor for
the re-sentencer, resulting in resentencing hearings that do not carry
meaningfully different results. As no studies have yet addressed this specific
scenario, more research is required before the impact of the anchoring effect
on second look resentencing is clear.
Second look sentencing is rising in popularity as states respond to
climbing prison costs and a renewed interest in rehabilitation.85 While
proponents emphasize its potential as a meaningful decarceral tool, should
decision makers reflexively impose the original sentence, the impact of
second look legislation on mass incarceration will be limited.
II. Child Defendants as Ideal Beneficiaries
A few states have enacted second look legislation that applies specifically
to defendants who were sentenced for acts committed as children. Children
make a natural beneficiary for these types of laws because the Supreme Court
has repeatedly acknowledged that they are less blameworthy than adults and
have a greater capacity for change.
In 2005’s Roper v. Simmons,86 the Supreme Court banned the death
penalty for defendants who were under eighteen at the time of their crime.87
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida,88 the Court did the same for children
sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicide crimes, holding that these

81. Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot”
Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 519–24 (2014); Nancy Gertner, Essay, What Yogi Berra
Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 137, 138 (2006)
(discussing the anchoring effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
82. See Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konečni, The Process of Sentencing Adult Felons:
A Causal Analysis of Judicial Decisions, in THE TRIAL PROCESS 413, 434, 442 (Bruce Dennis
Sales ed., 1981) (studying San Diego judges).
83. Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant
Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 188,
194 (2006).
84. Fariña et al., supra note 80, at 60.
85. See supra Part I.
86. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
87. Id. at 578.
88. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
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defendants were entitled to a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”89
Both of these cases rested on the premise that children have qualities that
make them less culpable than adults, namely immaturity, vulnerability, and
capacity for change.90 In 2012, the Court held in Miller v. Alabama91 that
individualized sentencing was required for children convicted of homicide
crimes before they could be sentenced to life without parole.92 The Court
required that a defendant’s “youth and attendant characteristics” be taken into
account at sentencing, emphasizing the same three categories that indicate
reduced culpability: immaturity, vulnerability, and capacity for change.93
Miller also noted that, in light of these categories, life-without-parole
sentences should be “uncommon.”94
Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Graham and Miller, states
explored a variety of legislative solutions to eliminate or limit life without
parole as a punishment for children. Some states simply converted lifewithout-parole sentences to life-with-parole sentences.95 Others went a step
further and created special guidelines for parole boards to consider in cases
involving child defendants.96 Three states enacted early second look statutes
for these groups.97
Beginning in 2013, the California legislature permitted children sentenced
to life without parole to petition for resentencing after serving fifteen years
89. Id. at 75.
90. Id. at 68 (citing Roper).
91. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
92. Id. at 483.
93. Id. at 471, 483.
94. Id. at 479. The Court attempted to differentiate between the majority of children
whose crimes had resulted from “transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose
crime reflects irreparable corruption,” indicating that life without parole should be reserved
for the latter group. Id. at 479–80 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005), and
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).
95. See Legislation Eliminating Life-Without-Parole Sentences for Juveniles, JUV.
SENT’G PROJECT, https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/legislation-eliminating-lwop (last
visited Aug. 2, 2022) (cataloguing legislative changes in the states since Miller).
96. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-621(b) (West 2021) (directing the parole board to
consider ten enumerated factors in assessing “how a minor offender is different from an adult
offender”).
97. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(1)(A) (West 2022) (permitting defendants sentenced to
life without parole for a crime committed under age eighteen to petition for resentencing after
serving fifteen years); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204A(d)(1)–(3) (West 2022) (permitting
child defendants convicted of murder to petition for resentencing after serving thirty years and
those convicted of lesser crimes to do so after twenty years); FLA. STAT. § 921.1402 (2015)
(allowing a “juvenile offender” to petition for resentencing after twenty-five years, provided
they did not have a prior conviction for certain violent crimes).
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of their sentence.98 If denied, the defendant had three more chances: they
could re-petition the court after serving twenty, twenty-four, and twenty-five
years.99 Delaware’s second look statute was more modest, allowing child
defendants convicted of murder to twice petition for resentencing: once after
serving thirty years and, if denied, again after five more years—although the
sentencing court retained discretion to prohibit the second petition.100 Florida
allowed for a single petition after twenty-five years of incarceration.101
Second look legislation aimed at child defendants with lengthy sentences
might be more palatable to legislators for several reasons. First, the Supreme
Court’s findings that children are less culpable and have a greater capacity
for positive change than adult defendants appear to reflect public opinion.
Two national polls conducted in 2020 showed that more than two-thirds of
voters, including more than two-thirds of Republicans, agree that all children
are capable of change.102 More than half of voters, including more than 50%
of Republicans, believe that life without parole is not an appropriate sentence
for someone who committed a crime as a child.103 Importantly, two-thirds of
voters supported the sentence review for these defendants after fifteen years
of incarceration with the possibility of release if they were found to no longer
threaten public safety.104 The qualities of reduced culpability and greater
capacity for change also provide a response for those concerned that second
look sentencing undermines retributivist aims: the adult seeking resentencing
is truly a different person, in a different position, from the child who received
the original sentence.
Second, the limited number of child defendants sentenced to life or
constructive life sentences lessens the concern that resentencing
opportunities will open the floodgates of litigation. As of 2020, there were
only 1,465 people serving life without parole for crimes committed as
children and an additional 1,716 people serving virtual life sentences—
sentences that exceed average life expectancy.105 These numbers are roughly
98. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(1)(A).
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(10).
100. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4204A(d)(2), (3).
101. FLA. STAT. § 921.1402(2)(a).
102. DATA FOR PROGRESS, THE JUST. COLLABORATIVE INST. & FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION,
A MAJORITY OF VOTERS SUPPORT AN END TO EXTREME SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 7–8 (2020),
https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/juvenile_life_without_parole.pdf.
103. Id. at 7–9.
104. Id. at 9.
105. JOSH ROVNER, THE SENT’G PROJECT, POLICY BRIEF: JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE:
AN OVERVIEW 1, 4 (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
Juvenile-Life-Without-Parole.pdf.
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3% of the overall life-without-parole and virtual life-without-parole
sentences nationwide.106
Third, while nearly all child defendants with life sentences are serving
time for violent crimes,107 there is reason to believe that their release would
not present a significant risk to public safety. Contrary to popular belief,
individuals convicted of more violent crimes tend to have lower recidivism
rates.108 More specifically, the early data on child defendants released
following resentencing hearings after Graham and Miller shows extremely
low recidivism rates. A study by Montclair State University showed that of
the 174 “juvenile lifers” released in Philadelphia since Miller, only six were
106. See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENT’G PROJECT, NO END IN SIGHT: AMERICA’S ENDURING
RELIANCE ON LIFE IMPRISONMENT 9–10 (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/No-End-in-Sight-Americas-Enduring-Reliance-on-Life-Imprison
ment.pdf (indicating that, as of 2020, 55,945 people were serving sentences of life without
parole and 42,353 people were serving virtual life sentences). An additional 105,567 people
were serving sentences of life with the possibility of parole. Id. As of 2016, 7,346 people were
serving sentences of life with parole for crimes committed as children. THE SENT’G PROJECT,
YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT 1 (2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/Youth-Sentenced-to-Life-Imprisonment.pdf. These individuals do
not become eligible for parole until they have served a period of incarceration ranging from
twenty-five to fifty-one years. Id. at 1–2.
107. In Graham v. Florida, the Supreme Court declared formal sentences of life without
parole unconstitutional for children convicted of nonhomicide crimes. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
While many states have applied Graham to virtual life sentences, not all have found that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits these sentences. See, e.g., Lucero v. People, 394 P.3d 1128, 1130
(Colo. 2017) (finding Graham and Miller do not apply to children sentenced to consecutive
terms of years for multiple offenses, even if the terms exceed expected lifespan). Accordingly,
it is possible for an individual to receive a virtual life sentence for commission of a nonviolent
crime.
108. J.J. Prescott et al., Understanding Violent-Crime Recidivism, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1643, 1668–70 (2020) (stating that a review of research consistently shows that “those
incarcerated for serious violent offenses reoffend at relatively low rates compared to other
released individuals” and that repeat-homicide recidivism is equal to or below 1%); JUST.
POL’Y INST., THE UNGERS, 5 YEARS AND COUNTING: A CASE STUDY IN SAFELY REDUCING
LONG PRISON TERMS AND SAVING TAXPAYER DOLLARS 9, 17 (2018), https://abell.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/02/JPI_The20Ungers20520Years20and20Counting_Nov_2018.pdf
(finding that only one of the 188 life-sentenced individuals released from prison due to an
illegal jury instruction was reincarcerated after five years); BARBARA LEVINE & ELSIE
KETTUNEN, CITIZENS ALL. ON PRISONS & PUB. SPENDING, PAROLING PEOPLE WHO COMMITTED
SERIOUS CRIMES: WHAT IS THE ACTUAL RISK? 3–4 (2014), https://www.prisonpolicy.
org/scans/cappsmi/CAPPS_Paroling_people_who_committed_serious_crimes_11_23_14.pd
f (finding individuals with convictions for second-degree murder, manslaughter, or a sex crime
who received parole in Michigan were approximately two-thirds less likely than the total
paroled population to be reincarcerated for a new crime within three years of release).
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rearrested, with only two of those arrests resulting in convictions.109 In
Michigan, only one of the 142 people released following Miller resentencing
hearings has been rearrested.110 In Louisiana, none of the sixty-eight people
who have received parole have been rearrested.111 Similarly, of the eighteen
individuals released under D.C.’s Incarceration Reduction Amendment Act,
not one has been rearrested.112 Accordingly, focusing second look legislation
on children sentenced to die in prison has the potential to satisfy both
progressives, who believe the laws must apply to those convicted of violent
crimes, and conservatives, who emphasize public safety concerns.
III. An Opportunity to Redress Sentencing Flaws for Child Defendants
Second look legislation also has the potential to redress the following
significant sentencing flaws that persist in the juvenile realm. First, despite
Miller’s mandate, evidence of a child defendant’s capacity for change is
difficult to accurately assess at the time of sentence. Second, arbitrary and
racially discriminatory outcomes pervade juvenile sentencing—a reality that
will likely be exacerbated by the discretion conferred on sentencing judges
in Jones v. Mississippi,113 the Court’s most recent Eighth Amendment case.
A. Assessing Capacity for Change
The first sentencing flaw is straightforward. The difficulty with assessing
an individual’s capacity for change is that it requires the court to make a
109. TARIKA DAFTARY-KAPUR & TINA M. ZOTTOLI, MONTCLAIR ST. UNIV., RESENTENCING
JUVENILE LIFERS: THE PHILADELPHIA EXPERIENCE 2 (2020), https://digitalcommons.
montclair.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=justice-studies-facpubs. The two
convictions were for Contempt and Robbery in the Third Degree. Id.
110. A Study of Michigan Suggests Released ‘Juvenile Lifers’ Rarely Reoffend, IMPRINT
(Aug. 23, 2021, 11:44 AM), https://imprintnews.org/news-briefs/michigan-released-juvenilelifers-rarely-reoffend/58122. The first of these individuals was released in 2016. See For
Juvenile Offenders, Supreme Court Ruling Opens Door to Parole, NPR (Feb. 15, 2016, 4:28
PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2016/02/15/466848817/for-juvenile-offenders-supreme-courtruling-opens-door-to-parole?t=1659534198736. Prior to 2016, Michigan contended that
Miller did not apply retroactively; however, the Court found to the contrary in that year’s
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). See For Juvenile Offenders, Supreme Court
Ruling Opens Door to Parole, supra.
111. Demario Davis & Stan Van Gundy, It’s Time for Louisiana to End Juvenile Life
Without Parole, LA. ILLUMINATOR (Apr. 29, 2021, 11:01 AM), https://lailluminator.com/
2021/04/29/its-time-for-louisiana-to-end-juvenile-life-without-parole-demario-davis-stanvan-gundy.
112. Howard, supra note 1.
113. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021); see infra notes 132–39 and
accompanying text.
OF
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prediction; however, there is no indication that the future criminal behavior
of children can be predicted accurately.114 In fact, research has consistently
shown that the same risk factors can appear in children who became lawabiding adults as in those who later exhibited violent conduct.115 Not only are
these judicial determinations inaccurate, but they tend to overpredict future
criminality,116 particularly for Black children and other children of color.117
114. See, e.g., Sarah French Russell, Second Looks at Sentences Under the First Step Act,
32 FED. SENT’G REP. 76, 78 (2019) (“[I]t is virtually impossible to determine at the time of
sentencing that a child is incapable of reform.”); Mary Marshall, Note, Miller v. Alabama and
the Problem of Prediction, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1633, 1657 (2019) (“All the limitations of
predicting future dangerousness in adults become more pronounced when making predictions
about whether a juvenile is capable of rehabilitation. There is substantial evidence to suggest
that such predictions are impossible.”); Kimberly Larson et al., Miller v. Alabama:
Implications for Forensic Mental Health Assessment at the Intersection of Social Science and
the Law, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 319, 335–36 (2013) (“[T]here is
currently no basis in current behavioral science nor well-informed professional knowledge
that can support any reliable forensic expert opinion on the relative likelihood of a specific
adolescent’s prospects for rehabilitation at a date that may be years to decades in the future.”);
Alex R. Piquero, Youth Matters: The Meaning of Miller for Theory, Research, and Policy
Regarding Developmental/Life-Course Criminology, 39 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 347, 355 (2013) (“[I]t is very difficult to predict early in the life-course which
individual juvenile offender will go on to become a recidivistic adult offender.”); Elizabeth
Scott et al., Juvenile Sentencing Reform in a Constitutional Framework, 88 TEMP. L. REV.
675, 684 (2016) (“[P]rediction of future violence from adolescent criminal behavior, even
serious criminal behavior, is unreliable and prone to error.”).
115. See, e.g., JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS, DIVERGENT
LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS TO AGE 70, at 276, 289–90 (2003) (discussing study of five hundred
American men from childhood to age seventy that found future criminal behavior difficult to
predict despite isolating risk factors); Rolf Loeber et al., Findings from the Pittsburgh Youth
Study: Cognitive Impulsivity and Intelligence as Predictors of the Age-Crime Curve, 51 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1136, 1146–47 (2012) (finding study of Pittsburgh
youth unsuccessful at predicting who would continue to offend into adulthood); Lila
Kazemian et al., Can We Make Accurate Long-Term Predictions About Patterns of DeEscalation in Offending Behavior?, 38 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 384, 397 (2009) (noting
that while the study predicted short-term behavior change, it did not indicate an ability to
predict changes in offending behavior within individuals over long periods of time).
116. See LAUB & SAMPSON, supra note 115, at 290 (discussing “the false positive
problem,” where prediction scales substantially overpredict future criminality); Loeber et al.,
supra note 115, at 1139 (revealing a high false-positive error rate for their study).
117. This has repeatedly been observed in the analogous inquiry in the capital context:
future dangerousness. See, e.g., Pamela A. Wilkins, Confronting the Invisible Witness: The
Use of Narrative to Neutralize Capital Jurors’ Implicit Racial Biases, 115 W. VA. L. REV.
305, 327–28 (2012) (discussing how data from the Capital Jury Project reveals racial bias in
future dangerousness assessments); TEX. DEF. SERV., DEADLY SPECULATION: MISLEADING
TEXAS CAPITAL JURIES WITH FALSE PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 42 (2004),
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Thus, capacity for change as a forward-looking inquiry encourages the
presentation of and reliance on predictive methods that constitute junk
science.118
Second look legislation shifts the forward-looking capacity-for-change
inquiry to a backward-looking determination of an individual’s
rehabilitation, replacing speculation with credible evidence. By doing so, it
both creates incentives for enrollment in rehabilitative programs and
provides a corrective mechanism for the inaccurate predictions of sentencing
judges.
B. Arbitrary and Racially Discriminatory Sentencing Outcomes
A common critique of individualized sentencing is that it results in
arbitrary and racially discriminatory outcomes.119 These problems are
heightened in the cases of children given life or virtual life sentences.
Scholars have emphasized that the racialized myth of the teen “superpredator”120 in the 1990s spurred a dramatic increase in juvenile
https://web.archive.org/web/20050310085640/https://www.texasdefender.org/DEADLYSP.
PDF (arguing that the jurors’ races and the defendant’s race have an “undeniable effect on
determinations of future dangerousness”); Kathryn Roe Eldridge, Racial Disparities in the
Capital System: Invidious or Accidental?, 14 CAP. DEF. J. 305, 317 (2002) (“[A]n African
American is more likely to face a jury which will be more prone to sentence him to death on
the future dangerousness predicate out of subconscious fears based on his race.”).
118. Critics have made similar arguments concerning the predictive “future
dangerousness” standard employed in Texas capital cases with adult defendants. Ana M.
Otero, The Death of Fairness: Texas’s Future Dangerousness Revisited, 4 U. DENV. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2014); Mark Hansen, A Dangerous Assessment, ABA J. (Oct. 11, 2004, 7:26 AM
CDT), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_dangerous_assessment.
119. See, e.g., M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal
Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320 (2014); Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in
Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. (SUPPLEMENT) 87S (2011); TUSHAR KANSAL, THE SENT’G
PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (Marc Mauer ed.,
2005); Kathryn E. Miller, The Eighth Amendment Power to Discriminate, 95 WASH. L. REV.
809, 815–16 (2020) (arguing that the individualized sentencing requirement in capital cases
has contributed to racially discriminatory sentencing outcomes).
120. John DiIulio, The Coming of the Super -- Predators, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 27,
1995, 12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-coming-ofthe-super-predators. DiIulio and others argued that “super-predators” were more likely to be
Black and Brown children who grew up in so-called “criminogenic communities.” WILLIAM
J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND
HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 22, 28 (1996). The theory was
widely rejected, and DiIulio himself has disavowed it. Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on
Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theorist-on-young-superpredators-bush-aide-
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incarceration, sentence length, and trying children as adults.121 In the years
leading up to Miller, 77% of the children receiving life sentences were
children of color.122 The victim’s race also factored into sentencing. One
study found that African American children were sentenced to life without
parole for killing a white person at nearly twice the rate they were arrested
for this crime.123 On the other hand, white children were only half as likely
to receive a life-without-parole sentence for killing a Black victim as their
arrest rate for this crime.124 Geography was also a determinant. Five states—
California, Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania—were
responsible for two-thirds of all life-without-parole sentences imposed for
children in the United States before 2016.125 Thirty-five percent of these lifewithout-parole sentences came from ten counties, while 20% of them came
from just three of these counties.126
Following Miller’s prohibition of mandatory life without parole for
children, racial disparities in life-without-parole sentences increased—
particularly with respect to African Americans—with the percentage of lifewithout-parole sentences imposed on Black children increasing from 61% to
72%.127 Geographic inequities persisted, as new prosecutions in Michigan
has-regrets.html; Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 37,
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647).
121. Kristin Henning, The Challenge of Race and Crime in a Free Society: The Racial
Divide in Fifty Years of Juvenile Justice Reform, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1604, 1620–22
(2018); John R. Mills et al., Juvenile Life Without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling
the Rapid Change Underway, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 538, 560–62, 581–86 (2016); Perry L.
Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. REV. 849,
850–57, 860–75 (2010); Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child As Other: Race and Differential
Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 711–12 (2002); Franklin
E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from an Ideological Battleground,
11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260–61 (1999).
122. ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, THE SENT’G PROJECT, NO EXIT: THE EXPANDING
USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 3 (2009), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/No-Exit-The-Expanding-Use-of-Life-Sentences-in-America.pdf.
123. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENT’G PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS
FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 5 (2012), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/01/The-Lives-of-Juvenile-Lifers.pdf (“The proportion of African Americans serving
JLWOP sentences for the killing of a white person (43.4%) is nearly twice the rate at which
African American juveniles are arrested for taking a white person’s life (23.2%) . . . .”).
124. Id.
125. Mills et al., supra note 121, at 563.
126. Id. at 571–72.
127. THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH, TIPPING POINT: A MAJORITY OF
STATES ABANDON LIFE-WITHOUT-PAROLE SENTENCES FOR CHILDREN 10 (2018), https://cfsy.
org/wp-content/uploads/Tipping-Point.pdf. A larger study is necessary to conclude that white
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and Louisiana exceeded those in other states in seeking life without parole.128
In resentencing hearings conducted after the Supreme Court held Miller
applied retroactively,129 Michigan prosecutors sought to reimpose life
without parole in 60% of cases, while Louisiana prosecutors did so in 30%
of cases.130 The Associated Press summed up the post-Miller sentencing
landscape: “The odds of release or continued imprisonment vary from state
to state, even county to county, in a pattern that can make justice seem
arbitrary.”131
In 2021, the Court decided Jones v. Mississippi,132 a decision that I have
argued is only likely to exacerbate these sentencing disparities.133 Not only
did Jones explicitly reject the notion that sentencing judges must find that a
child defendant is “permanently incorrigible” before sentencing them to life
without parole for homicide,134 but it also held that sentencing judges need
not make factual findings before imposing sentences.135 Jones reduced
Miller’s mandate to the pithy “youth matters,” finding juvenile life-withoutparole sentences were consistent with the Eighth Amendment so long as the
sentencer did not explicitly reject youth as a factor.136 The decision unfettered
the discretion of sentencing judges and rendered their decisions nearly
unreviewable—creating maximal conditions for arbitrary and racially
discriminatory outcomes.137
In her dissenting opinion in Jones, Justice Sotomayor compared
sentencing outcomes in two states—Mississippi and Pennsylvania—to
illustrate how unfettered discretion can exacerbate sentencing disparities.138
In Mississippi, where judicial discretion lacked explicit boundaries, more
than 25% of resentencings resulted in reimposing life without parole;
defendants sentenced to life without parole were not disproportionately found in states that
abolished these sentences following Miller, which is an alternative, and less invidious,
explanation for the increase in the sentencing rate of Black children to life without parole.
128. Id. at 7.
129. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016).
130. THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH, supra note 127, at 7.
131. Sharon Cohen & Adam Geller, AP Exclusive: Parole for Young Lifers Inconsistent
Across US, AP NEWS (July 31, 2017), https://apnews.com/article/mo-state-wire-courts-arstate-wire-mi-state-wire-north-america-a592b421f7604e2b88a170b5b438235f.
132. Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021).
133. Kathryn E. Miller, Resurrecting Arbitrariness, 107 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3942881.
134. Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1311.
135. Id. at 1314–16.
136. Id. at 1314, 1320 n.7.
137. Miller, supra note 133.
138. Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1333–34 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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whereas, in Pennsylvania, which adopted sentencing guidelines including a
rebuttable presumption against life without parole, only 2% of defendants
were resentenced to life without parole.139 While more research is needed to
determine if arbitrary and racially discriminatory outcomes will increase
following Jones, it is clear that these outcomes remain a significant obstacle
to juvenile sentencing.
IV. Procedural Recommendations
To redress arbitrary and racially discriminatory sentencing outcomes, and
to avoid reflexive impositions of original sentences, this Essay proposes three
additions to second look legislation aimed at children sentenced to die in
prison: automatic eligibility for resentencing at age twenty-five, jury
resentencing, and shielding the defendant’s original sentence from the
decision maker.
A. A Research-Based Incarceration Threshold
Rather than adopt a term of years as a threshold period of incarceration, I
propose that children sentenced to die in prison become automatically
eligible for resentencing when they reach the age of twenty-five.
The threshold incarceration amount for second look resentencing varies.
Although the Model Penal Code recommends that juveniles become eligible
for resentencing after ten years of incarceration,140 even the most ambitious
legislation has required at least fifteen years.141 Other proposed legislation
demands as many as thirty years.142 The problem with these varying
thresholds is that they are arbitrary, lacking scientific grounding and likely
resulting from compromise among various constituencies.
Although not extensive, research indicates that periods of criminality tend
to last for much shorter time periods—only five to ten years—with the
greatest frequency of criminal activity typically occurring in the late teenage

139. Id.
140. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11(A)(h) (AM. L. INST., Proposed Final Draft
2017) (permitting petition for resentencing after ten years for child defendants).
141. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-403.03(a)(1) (West 2021) (requiring fifteen years of
incarceration for resentencing eligibility); see also Second Chances Agenda, supra note 12
(compiling pending second look legislation).
142. E.g., H.B. 2451, 58th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2021) (allowing child defendants to
petition for resentencing after thirty years of incarceration).
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years.143 Increases in already lengthy sentences—for example, from twenty
years to life—do not have a significant deterrent effect.144 Explanations for
why this is the case include that most people committing crimes do not know
the details of the law;145 that many crimes are committed impulsively,
without rigorous cost-benefit analysis;146 that other crimes result from mental
illness or substance abuse that distorts reasoning;147 that many people
committing crimes do not believe they will be caught;148 and that many
people discount future consequences as compared to present benefits.149
Importantly, for child defendants, additional research provides guidance
on when sentences should be eligible for reevaluation—one that
complements the data on shorter sentences. Neuroscientific research
indicates that brain development continues until approximately age twentyfive.150 This includes development of the prefrontal cortex, which regulates
impulses and emotions, assesses risk, and engages in long-term planning.151
Because neuroscientists agree that most people achieve maturity of the
prefrontal cortex at age twenty-five, I propose that second look legislation
adopt this age as its eligibility requirement. This will permit defendants to
seek resentencing as fully mature adults and to provide evidence of their
capacity for change. Adopting this proposal will create varying periods of
incarceration thresholds for child defendants of different ages, with thirteen143. See Alex R. Piquero et al., Criminal Career Patterns, in FROM JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION 14,
14–17 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 2012).
144. Daniel S. Nagin, Guest Post: Reduce Prison Populations by Reducing Life Sentences,
WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2019, 6:30 AM EDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/crimelaw/2019/03/21/guest-post-reduce-prison-populations-by-reducing-life-sentences.
145. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 175–78 (2004).
146. Id. at 179.
147. Id. at 179–80.
148. Id. at 185.
149. Id. at 194–95.
150. Andy Murdock, The Evolutionary Advantage of the Teenage Brain, UNIV. OF CAL.
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/evolutionary-advantageteenage-brain; Stephen Johnson, Why Is 18 the Age of Adulthood If the Brain Can Take 30
Years to Mature?, BIG THINK (Jan. 31, 2022), https://bigthink.com/neuropsych/adult-brain;
Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE &
TREATMENT 449, 451 (2013); Brain Maturity Extends Well Beyond Teen Years, NPR (Oct. 10,
2011, 12:00 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=141164708.
151. Murdock, supra note 150; Johnson, supra note 150; Arain et al., supra note 150, at
453. Age twenty-five is not a bright line for the prefrontal cortex’s cessation of development;
some individuals continue development past this point, while others develop more quickly.
See Johnson, supra note 150.
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year-old defendants serving as much as twelve years of incarceration and
nineteen-year-old defendants serving only six years. This difference roughly
corresponds with the five to ten years of criminality that most people exhibit
and requires incarceration during the late teenage years, when crimes are
committed most frequently.152 Moreover, grounding eligibility requirements
in neuroscience, as opposed to sentence lengths, may prove more acceptable
for different political constituencies, as it avoids debates on how long is long
enough.
While under this proposal a child defendant becomes eligible for
resentencing at age twenty-five, they are not required to seek resentencing at
that point. This flexibility allows those who have difficulty adjusting to
incarceration to take more time to demonstrate rehabilitation if desired.
Additionally, any second look legislation should include a renewal period,
where those who fail to achieve a sentence reduction can petition again for
resentencing after an intervening time. Not only does this continue to
incentivize rehabilitation, but it also provides opportunities for defendants
who are late to mature and for those who suffer significant institutional
trauma during their incarceration. Considering research on criminality
periods, this renewal threshold should be no more than ten years.
B. Jury Sentencing
I have argued in a previous work that child defendants faced with possible
life sentences should be entitled to jury sentencing.153 There, I make the case
that, although imperfect, jury sentencing is a better route than judicial
sentencing when seeking to avoid racially discriminatory outcomes.154 I note
that both judges and juries fall prey to implicit biases, but emphasize that
there is no indication that judges are better at avoiding these biases than
jurors.155 I also acknowledge that juries contain far fewer people of color than
they should—due, in part, to structural defects that base jury pool selection
on voter registration, that disqualify individuals with felony convictions from
service, and that permit prosecutors to engage in the racially discriminatory
use of peremptory strikes.156
Despite these limitations, I conclude that jury sentencing has the potential
to lead to less racially discriminatory outcomes for two reasons. First, most

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
Miller, supra note 133, at 47–52.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 46–47.
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state court trial-level judges are elected157 and often campaign on being
“tough on crime.”158 Because they do not seek election, jurors lack the
political pressure that judges may feel to punish harshly.159 Second, research
shows that decision-maker identity plays a significant role in sentencing.160
Because juries are inherently more likely to contain diverse viewpoints and
identities than that of a single judge, they are less likely to fall prey to racial
bias, particularly when given the same sentencing guidelines that judges
receive.161
Jury sentencing is preferable for a second reason. It typically results in a
more robust development and introduction of mitigation evidence, including
the presentation of witnesses, as opposed to judicial sentencing, which often
merely consists of oral argument by the parties.162
The arguments that favor jury sentencing apply equally to jury
resentencing; however, an additional advantage exists in the resentencing
context. Most states’ statutory schemes, when possible, assign the
defendant’s original sentencing judge to conduct their resentencing. In these
scenarios, the judge is likely to be influenced by their original sentencing
determination. Even if the resentencing judge did not impose the original
sentence, they may feel pressure to defer to a colleague’s determination.
These influences would not apply to jurors.
A typical objection to jury sentencing is that it is more resource
intensive;163 however, given the small number of children sentenced to die in
prison, this argument is less weighty in the context of resentencing this group.
Moreover, some states, including more politically conservative states like

157. Judicial Selection: Significant Figures, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 4, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/judicial-selection-significantfigures.
158. Meghan J. Ryan, The Missing Jury: The Neglected Role of Juries in Eighth
Amendment Punishments Clause Determinations, 64 FLA. L. REV. 549, 550 (2012).
159. See Miller, supra note 133, at 28–29.
160. Id. at 26–32, 48.
161. Id. at 47–52.
162. Sarah French Russell, Jury Sentencing and Juveniles: Eighth Amendment Limits and
Sixth Amendment Rights, 56 B.C. L. REV. 553, 611–12 (2015) (“With a jury empaneled, judges
are likely to allow more time for the presentation of evidence, and defense lawyers may more
readily recognize the need for a higher level of development of mitigating evidence.”).
163. See id. at 612.
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Arkansas and Oklahoma, already permit jury resentencing for these child
defendants.164
Because juries are less likely to engage in racially discriminatory
sentencing than judges, and because jury sentencing promotes a rich
evidentiary record, second look legislation for child defendants should
provide a right to jury resentencing.165
C. Sentence Shielding
Finally, to avoid reflexive imposition of the original sentence, second look
legislation should prevent re-sentencers from knowing the original sentence.
At least one court has already found that the introduction of this information
is more prejudicial than probative because it diminishes re-sentencers’ sense
of responsibility and encourages them to improperly consider the original
sentence in determining a new sentence.166 Shielding decision makers from
the original sentence also prevents them from relying on that sentence as an
anchoring amount, which is particularly problematic in the context of
children sentenced to die in prison—in which original sentences are often of
dubious constitutionality.167
Shielding is more achievable in the context of jury resentencing. It can be
difficult, if not impossible, to prevent judges from knowing the original
sentence of a defendant appearing before them for resentencing—particularly
if the judges themselves imposed that sentence.168 But this is also the case if
164. See Kitchell v. State, 594 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Ark. 2020) (discussing jury resentencing
of a seventeen-year-old defendant who was originally sentenced to life without parole); 22
OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 929(B)–(C) (West 2022).
165. Because research on noncapital jury sentencing is somewhat limited, second look
legislation should also permit defendants to waive their right to jury resentencing without
requiring prosecutorial approval, should the defendant prefer judicial resentencing. See Guha
Krishnamurthi, The Constitutional Right to Bench Trial, 100 N.C. L. REV. 1621, 1624 (2022).
166. Kitchell, 594 S.W.3d at 853; see also People v. Woolley, 793 N.E.2d 519, 520 (Ill.
2002) (finding a defendant’s original death sentence inadmissible at a capital resentencing
hearing); Hammond v. State, 776 So. 2d 884, 889 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (same).
167. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (finding life-without-parole sentences
unconstitutional for child defendants convicted of nonhomicide crimes); Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (holding that mandatory life-without-parole sentences are
unconstitutional for child defendants convicted of homicide); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577
U.S. 190, 212 (2016) (finding Miller retroactively applicable); People v. Contreras, 411 P.3d
445, 447, 462 (Cal. 2018) (finding a sentence of fifty to life for a child defendant convicted of
a nonhomicide crime unconstitutional under Graham).
168. See Guthrie et al., supra note 75, at 827 (“Another important advantage of a jury trial
is that it creates a mechanism for keeping potentially misleading information away from the
fact finder.”).
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a close colleague imposed the original sentence or if the case generated a
high profile. Because documents from the defendant’s original casefile might
be relevant to resentencing, third-party redaction would be required to ensure
adequate shielding from judicial eyes.169
Opponents might complain that shielding may also limit the testimony of
victim impact statements to the effects of the crime itself, prohibiting
statements related to any emotional anguish caused by the uncertainty of the
resentencing process.170 However, victim impact testimony has always had
substantive limitations, and at least one state has found comment on the
original sentence to be one of them.171
Because preventing re-sentencers from learning a child defendant’s
original sentence prevents them both from reflexively reimposing it and from
using it as a flawed standard of reference, second look legislation should
require sentence shielding.
Conclusion
Second look legislation aimed at children sentenced to die in prison has
significant promise as an entry point to achieving meaningful decarceration,
provided states adopt three procedural safeguards. First, research suggests
that eligibility for resentencing should coincide with neurological
maturation, which occurs at age twenty-five. Second, mandating jury
resentencing will incentivize robust presentations of evidence and will
reduce the risk of racially discriminatory outcomes. Finally, shielding the
sentencer from knowledge of the defendant’s original sentence reduces the
likelihood of reflexive reimposition of that sentence.
Although only a small number of defendants would be eligible for
resentencing, this limited application could make the legislation politically
feasible in more conservative states. Because each of these defendants would
almost certainly have convictions for violent crimes, the legislation would
also appeal to progressive groups who wish to build the case for expanding
this legislation. Likelihood for success is high, as early data indicates that
children convicted of homicide who are released as adults have very low
recidivism rates. Should the legislation’s success eventually result in a

169. Even with sentence shielding, judges would likely be aware that in order for a
resentencing to be occurring at all, the defendant must have initially received a life sentence.
This judicial awareness is another reason that states should mandate jury resentencing.
170. See Kitchell, 594 S.W.3d at 853 (finding victim impact testimony of this type
irrelevant and prejudicial).
171. See id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol75/iss1/9

2022]

A SECOND LOOK FOR CHILDREN

167

second look for adults convicted of violent crimes, the opportunity for
decarceration is significant.
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